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Few people disagree on the need for sustainable development, but ideas about what it exactly 
means and how to pursue it diverge considerably. Although such normative conflicts are key to 
sustainability transitions, attention to such conflicts is lacking in transition studies. In this paper 
we understand societal conflict as an informal assessment of sustainable transition pathways with 
the potential for learning about normative ideas about the direction, speed and means of 
transitions. We analyse the Dutch societal conflict on the plans for shale gas exploration between 
2010 and 2013, based on a media-analysis and interviews, in order to identify the normative 
conflicts and to find out to which extent these normative conflicts resulted in higher-order 
learning. The two main normative conflicts in the case firstly concern the role of gas in the 
energy transition, and secondly the balance between local and national interests in defining the 
public interest. With that, the societal conflict challenges two key elements of the Dutch welfare 
state. We conclude that there has been higher-order learning as regards the first conflict, but not 
as regards the second.  
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1. Introduction  
A ‘sustainability transition’ is a radical, structural change of society that is the result of a 
coevolution of economic, cultural, technological, ecological, and institutional developments 
allowing for sustainable development. Sustainable development suggests a social consensus on 
norms of what we consider to be unsustainable and what constitutes progress [1]. Yet, although 
hardly anyone disagrees with the ambition to develop society in a sustainable way, ideas about 
what to achieve exactly, how, and how fast, diverge considerably [2]. Such ideas strongly depend 
on the, often conflicting, perspectives and interests of different actors and play out differently on 
different geographical and time scales. As such, sustainability transitions give rise to normative 
conflicts. Since normative conflicts are part and parcel to sustainability transitions, we argue that 
they should be more central in transition studies. 
 
Firstly, to the extent that normative conflict is addressed in transition theories, it usually concerns 
conflict between regimes and niches [3-5]. This understanding builds on the dominant theoretical 
framework in transition studies, the multi-level perspective [6, 7], which describes the change of 
dominant, socio-technical regimes as a result of both emerging niches and changing landscape 
developments. Studies on sustainability transitions usually define their niches around (in some 
aspects) more sustainable technologies and position them against a dominant, change averse and 
unsustainable regime. Examples include studies of renewable energy niches versus fossil energy 
regimes [8], sustainable health care models versus the health care regime [9], or sustainable food 
versus the food regime [10, 11]. This distinction is often implicitly self-referential, in the sense 
that the niche is assumed to provide the solution for the problem that is produced by the regime. 
The multi-level perspective thus suggests that conflicts arise between a (problematic) regime and 
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a (desirable) niche; the niche is contested by the regime and the other way around. This does not 
concur however with the empirical reality of normative conflicts. First, niches (e.g. renewable 
energy niches) are usually not only contested by actors that act within the corresponding regime 
(e.g. the fossil energy regime), but also by citizens, NGOs or governmental levels or departments 
that are not part of this regime [12, 13]. Think of municipal spatial planning conflicts over wind 
parks or neighbours protesting against a biogas installation. Second, regimes are not always 
change averse and many actors from the incumbent regimes also pursue a transition [14, 15]. 
Think for instance of innovations developed by regime actors such as district heating, smart 
energy meters to influence consumer behaviour and carbon capture and storage (CCS). Such 
initiatives cannot always be regarded as incremental, maintaining the status quo and therefore 
ultimately as barriers to sustainability transitions [16]. In all these cases the multi-level 
perspective does not offer the analytical framework to research and understand the conflicts that 
result from normative diversity and its influence on transitions. 
 
Secondly, as Stirling [2] notes, transition studies have not yet engaged into the study of normative 
diversity. Normative conflicts are treated as contingent hurdles that need to be overcome to allow 
the final ‘closing down’ of the modalities for particular transitions, rather than as entrance points 
for the ‘opening up’ of divergent possibilities for societal transformation [17, 18]. This is 
reflected in many of the governance approaches advocated in transition studies, such as the use of 
transition arenas that focus on collaborative and consensus-oriented efforts by leading 
stakeholders. With that, transition theory has the tendency to neglect the way that conflicting 
societal visions are played out in political arena’s and in society [19]. Shove and Walker advocate 
that many socio-technical configurations are not unproblematic desirable elements in an equally 
consensual, equally unproblematic interpretation of sustainability [20]. To an increasing extent, 
5 
 
these issues are being recognised in transition theory [21-24]. However, frameworks that support 
the detailed empirical and conceptual analysis of the socio-political dynamics influencing 
transitions still need to be developed [3, 10, 15, 25, 26].  
 
We contribute to the analysis and conceptualization of normative conflict in transition studies by 
focusing on societal conflict. Societal conflict concerns the socio-political dynamics by which 
contending normative perspectives regarding a new technology are articulated. Societal conflict 
both builds on and reveals different normative appraisals regarding a specific sociotechnical 
future and can therefore be regarded as a form of informal assessment [65]. “Controversies 
provide partly conflicting assessments of technologies or of the impacts of proposed or actual 
projects, that are further articulated and consolidated in the course of a controversy. Thus, 
informal technology assessment occurs” [65, p350]. ‘Informal’ means that the assessment is not 
formalized through institutionalized procedures for technology assessment, such as is the case for 
e.g. environmental impact assessment and social cost-benefit analysis. While the assessment can 
be characterized as informal, it is shaped strongly by formal procedures and institutions. One 
example is the recurring finding that citizens oppose new technology because they consider the 
formal procedures for public consultation not adequate or fair [27, 28].   
 
The understanding of social conflict as informal technology assessment suggests that societal 
conflict creates a potential for higher-order learning [e.g. 29, 30]. After all, the articulated 
normative conflicts can result in scrutinizing underlying presumptions and changed problem 
definitions. Higher-order learning is considered prerequisite for sustainable transformation of 
technology-based systems [31-34], and more generally for system innovation, policy change and 
socio-technical transitions [35-37]. Higher-order learning is defined here as a change in the 
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meaning that is collectively attached to a technology and/or the socio-technical system of which 
it is part. Ideally, the informal assessment that takes place in societal conflicts creates such 
change and, by that, facilitates more democratic, robust or effective governance of transitions.  
 
The objective of this paper is to contribute to transition studies by empirically exploring how the 
study of societal conflict can reveal insight into normative diversity and higher-order learning in 
transitions. For this we use the case of shale gas in the Netherlands. We answer the question: 
Which normative conflicts can be identified in this case and to what extent did these normative 
conflicts result in higher-order learning? 
 
The case of shale gas in the period 2010-2013 is chosen for two reasons. First, shale gas in the 
Netherlands is a typical case in which conflicts abound [28, 38] but where the multi-level 
perspective is problematic. The introduction of shale gas is contested, not by the incumbent 
regime, but by NGOs and local actors. The companies starting shale gas exploration are small 
newcomers on the (established) gas market, resembling a niche, but these companies have strong 
ties and are backed by the regime. Furthermore, the desirability of shale gas itself is ambiguous 
and contested [28, 38]. For actors from the energy sector that have vested interests, natural gas 
including shale gas is an attractive transition fuel that allows the use of current infrastructures of 
energy exploration and distribution. Furthermore, it can be used as a buffer for intermittent solar 
and wind energy while its environmental impact is much lower than that of coal. From a global 
perspective, there are still many reserves. Thus, analysis of the introduction of shale gas as a 
conflict between a (problematic) regime and a (desirable) niche (the common multi-level 




Second, and in line with the theme for this special issue, shale gas is linked to the broader 
discussion on transitions in the welfare state. The Dutch welfare state is intrinsically connected to 
the production of natural gas. Since 1980, 5 to 15 billion euros were generated by gas production 
each year – amounting to 5 to 10% of the total income of the Dutch government [39]. This 
additional income has allowed the Dutch state to invest in infrastructure, knowledge, innovation, 
and socioeconomic policy. As the gas fields are quickly depleting, we see a variety of 
governmental activities that are aimed to keep up the role of the Netherlands as a key player in 
the production and/or distribution of natural gas in Europe, including, at the time of our study, 
shale gas activities [28, 40]. In addition, governance issues in the energy and environmental 
domain are illustrative for wider governance issues in the socio-economic welfare state. While 
the welfare state traditionally provides equal access to public goods such as health care and 
education, counteracts market failures and redistributes incomes and (mis-) fortunes, it has been 
transformed immensely due to the privatization of the public sector, including the energy sector 
[41, 42]. The natural gas sector has become a patchwork of organizations that are scattered over 
the public and private domain, leading to many questions about the ownership and management 
of the industry. Increasingly, the welfare state sees the legitimacy of state interventions contested 
by society. Traditionally, collective decisions in the Netherlands were taken upon the basis of a 
broad consultation between government, industry and NGOs [43-45]. To a large extent, this 
‘pillarised’ model guaranteed public consent. This is no longer the case. Traditional, opaque, 
forms of decision-making meet with widespread discontent. This new public mentality has 
manifested itself in relation to the gas sector in a very salient manner: the production of the main 
gas field, in the Northern province of Groningen, has not only been reduced because of depletion 





In the next section (2), we explain the method used for our analysis. Our approach consists of two 
main parts: a detailed chronological storyline of the societal conflict on shale gas and longitudinal 
thematic cluster analysis with the help of the software package T-Lab. The storyline of the 
conflict is presented in Section 3, and the thematic cluster analysis in Section 4. Based on these 
results, two main normative conflicts are identified and discussed in Section 5. These normative 
conflicts arise from divergent answers to the following questions: ‘What is the role of gas in the 
energy transition?’ and ‘How to balance local and national interests in defining the public 
interest?’. Conclusions and ideas for further research are presented in Section 6. 
2. Method 
We used an exploratory approach to analyse the socio-political dynamics of the societal conflict 
on shale gas. First, we constructed a detailed chronological storyline of the controversy based on 
media analysis and interviews. This storyline is used to identify the normative conflicts. Second, 
we did a longitudinal thematic cluster analysis of newspaper articles with the help of the software 
package T-Lab. This analysis was used to explore higher-order learning, which is defined as a 
change in the meaning that is collectively attached to a technology and/or the socio-technical 
system of which it is part, the unit of analysis is the collective level of decision-making regarding 
shale gas. With the thematic cluster analysis we are able to analyse higher-order learning, 
operationalized as changes in discourse structures, problem definitions and policy objectives. 
Newspapers reflect societal discourse and are as such a useful source for analysing societal 
conflict. The analysis furthermore involves interpretative work, which we tried to validate as 
much as possible by building on existing studies [46, 47] and interviews (see 2.1). We first 
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explain how data were gathered (2.1). Then we explain how the storyline of the controversy was 
constructed (2.2) and, finally, how we conducted the thematic cluster analysis (2.3).  
2.1 Data 
A dataset was set up with newspaper articles from national and regional journals and newspapers 
by searching on the word ‘schaliegas’ (Dutch word for shale gas) in the database LexisNexis. 
Sources included: 1) 14 national newspapers; 2) 18 local and regional newspapers; 3) four 
professional journals; and 4) four magazines. The search was limited to a period of 30 months: 
November 2010 to April 2013. This period was chosen for practical reasons: the software 
package used for the thematic cluster analysis (explained below) is not able to assign more than 
30 different labels per variable. Therefore, it cannot analyse more than 30 months at once. The 
articles were labelled with the variables ID-number, newspaper, year, month, and day.  
Furthermore, semi- structured interviews were conducted with ten experts who were considered 
knowledgeable on the Dutch societal debate on shale gas. These experts included a civil servant 
from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, an employee of Cuadrilla, a mediator of a consultancy 
firm involved in the process, four academics, and three journalists
1
. They were asked about what 
they considered meaningful events in the shale gas debate, the role of other actors, their own role, 
and the thematic scope of the shale gas debate. They were also questioned about the role of the 
media. The goal of the semi-structured interviews was to validate and supplement the results, to 
identify potential relations between actors, discourses and events and to aid in a critical reflection 
on media analyses. This way, the interviews helped us to interpret the media analysis. Interview 
data were coded. 
                                                 
1
 Unfortunately we were not able to interview an expert from civil society. 
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2.2 Constructing the storyline 
Based on the data from the LexisNexis database, first a frequency analysis was carried out to get 
an impression of the development of the controversy over time. Second, a (simplified) event 
history analysis was used. As part of this analysis, a list of events was created and the events 
were coded. We distinguished between i) events that could be attributed to one or multiple actors, 
and ii) external events such as natural events, economic events and events from abroad. We 
furthermore analysed whether events were used to argue in favour of, or against, shale gas 
exploration and production in The Netherlands. This resulted in a so-called bit-map [based on 
48]. Events were then analysed in terms of their duration and frequency of occurrence. Based on 
this, key events were identified that were in a later stage supplemented and validated by the 
interviews and the elementary context analysis (explained below) and previous analyses of the 




















































































































































































Based on the results of the frequency analysis (Figure 1) and key events identified in the 
storyline, we split up the full period (Nov 2010 – Apr 2013) into nine time periods. Peak 
publication periods were separated from periods with lower publication levels. A peak was 
defined as a period of increasing publication level and a minimum publication level of 19. In case 
of an increase larger than 200% the requirement on number of publications was omitted. This 
way all time periods could fulfil the T-lab requirements (see 2.3). Based on qualitative analysis, 
the nine periods were condensed into five consecutive stages that together form the storyline 
(Section 3).  
2.3 Longitudinal thematic cluster analysis 
The software package T-lab was used to thematically cluster the available media data. This was 
done both for the full dataset, i.e. the full research period, as well as for the nine time periods to 
explore discursive change over time. T-lab uses linguistic and statistical tools to analyse texts 
[49]. T-lab assists the researcher in finding meaningful patterns in text files in a systematic, and, 
moreover, ‘bottom-up’ way. This means that analysis is based on structures that emerge from the 
data rather than on predefined categories or coding schemes. Furthermore, it makes it possible to 
analyse a larger dataset of texts which gives statistically better, and therefore more representative, 
results.  
T-lab makes a distinction between context units and lexical units. Context units are chunks of text 
of comparable length or paragraphs (in this case approximately 50 words) used to divide the 
newspaper articles. Lexical units are the words themselves. Occurrence (lexical unit x context 
unit) and co-occurrence (lexical unit x lexical unit) matrices are created, which together serve as 
the basis for all T-Labs operations [50]. These matrices are used to characterise each chunk of 
text (context unit) with the lexical units that occur in it and each lexical unit (word) is 
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characterised by the other lexical units it often occurs together with. Then a statistical clustering 
technique (bisecting K-means) is used to find thematic clusters within the text consisting of 
contexts that show high similarity in words and word sequence. T-lab places the clusters in a 
multi-dimensional graph, which can be used for interpretation of the clusters. The software 
provides a list of context units that are typical to a cluster. These were used for analysis and 
interpretation of the discourse structures of the thematic clusters. Since the K-means technique 
uses hierarchical clustering methods (it starts off with one cluster), it can be studied which cluster 
is the parent and which is the offspring, thereby enabling analysis of similarity between clusters. 
A thematic cluster analysis was performed for the first eight subsets of data that were 
distinguished based on the frequency analysis and event history analysis (the ninth period was not 
included in our original research plan but added later in the analysis of newspaper articles and 
interviews as it seemed interesting to include). The analyses were performed multiple times to 
test reliability.  
The thematic clusters that were found for the eight separate time periods were analysed and the 
elementary contexts appointed by T-lab were interpreted to qualitatively attach meaning to each 
cluster. To analyse relative dominance of each cluster, a frequency analysis was carried out on 
the number of elementary contexts per theme (over time). The longitudinal development of 
thematic clusters was analysed and interpreted based on the analysis of events and storyline 
explained above. The cluster analysis showed three thematic clusters, which we labelled as: 1) 
safety and environment, 2) utility and necessity, and 3) procedural justice. These will be 
discussed in section 4.  
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3. Results (1): storyline of the shale gas controversy 
In this section the storyline is presented in five stages. Stage 5 (May to August 2013) was not 
analysed with T-lab as it was not part of our original research plan, but was included later in the 
analysis of newspaper articles and interviews as it proved interesting to do so. The description of 
each stage starts with a figure showing the frequency of newspaper articles and the events that 
characterise this stage. In the text references are added to the numbered events in the figures as to 
help the reader to understand the figures.  
3.1 Stage 1: Rising societal unrest 
Shale gas was introduced in the Netherlands when Cuadrilla requested permits for the province of 
Noord-Brabant and for the Noordoostpolder area. In August 2009, Cuadrilla was granted an 
exploration permit for hydrocarbons for an area in the province of Noord-Brabant and in June 
2010 for the Noordoostpolder (1) [51, 52]. Concurrently, EBN, a state-owned organization that 
supports the Dutch energy sector by facilitating investment and providing information, reported 
positively on the expectations for the potential of shale gas available in the Netherlands [53]. 
Figure 2 Frequency analysis and events in the first and second period of the societal debate:  
Cuadrilla receives permit (1), Gasland documentary (2), information meeting Haaren (3), Rabobank expresses concerns 
(4), Earthquakes in Blackpool (5), Brabant Water expresses concerns (6), National political parties visit information 
meeting in Boxtel (7). 
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After receiving a permit for Noord-Brabant, Cuadrilla started investigating suitable locations and 
started a dialogue with the municipalities of these locations; the municipalities of Boxtel and 
Haaren. Cuadrilla requested location specific permits at these municipalities (September 2010 
and June 2010 respectively) and both agreed to deviate from their zoning plan temporarily. 
Boxtel
2
 informed the community and organised two information meetings and a city council 
meeting (3). After setting several conditions for shale gas exploration they granted Cuadrilla the 
permit (January 2011). At this point the newspapers started writing about the plans in Boxtel and 
Haaren, and citizens started searching for information on the Internet. They found several studies 
performed in the US on air and water pollution in relation to shale gas exploration and 
production. A documentary on the impact of shale gas exploration and production in the US, 
‘Gasland’, played an important role in triggering public debate (2). In the most influential scene 
of the documentary, someone holds a lighter to a tap to show that running water can be set on fire 
due to gas leakage. The protests in the Netherlands became more organised when the protest 
group ‘Schaliegasvrij Haaren’ (Shale Gas Free Haaren) was founded and started an online 
petition. Following this, a provincial environmental NGO (Brabantse Milieu Federatie), and later 
also another environmental NGO (Milieudefensie) got involved. Also people in Boxtel started to 
organise their protest after Gasland was shown in Boxtel at an information meeting. Boxtel 
defined a strategy against shale gas and ‘Schaliegasvrij Boxtel’ (Shale Gas Free Boxtel) was 
founded. A regional newspaper, Brabants Dagblad, used the Dutch law on public access to 
governmental information (Wet Openbaarheid Bestuur) to find out what chemicals are used for 
fracking. Objections also arose from a bank (Rabobank) and a water company (Brabant Water), 
with Rabobank arguing that tremors caused by shale gas exploration could damage their nearby 
                                                 
2
 Wherever we write ‘Boxtel’ or ‘Haaren’ we refer to the local governments of those municipalities. 
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data centre (4). Rabobank filed an official complaint. Brabant Water was worried about aquifer 
contamination but was too late for official complaints (6). These protests resulted in interest from 
national newspapers.  
Meanwhile, local and regional governments got concerned. An alderman from Haaren 
investigated what could be done by the municipality to block shale gas exploration. In Boxtel an 
information meeting was organised with representatives of the national political parties Green 
Left and the Labour Party (7). The provincial parliament of Noord-Brabant got concerned and 
sent a letter, together with the municipality of Boxtel, to the Minister of Economic Affairs to ask 
for a moratorium and an independent study on the pros and cons of shale gas exploration and 
production. The Minister, in response, believed the legislation and experience within the 
Netherlands to be sufficient and turned down the request. When negative responses continued 
however, he requested Cuadrilla to perform more studies. 
The end of this period is marked with developments abroad, e.g. several newspapers reported on 
Poland, being positive about shale gas developments because it would make the country less 
dependent on Russia. Also, the newspapers reported that the Dutch gas reserves (mainly the large 
natural gas deposit in Groningen) are declining, and that the Netherlands would become more and 
more dependent on imported natural gas from, amongst others, Russia. At the same time, 
newspapers reported on earthquakes in Blackpool (UK) that were caused by fracking activities in 




3.2 Stage 2: The road to a moratorium   
 
Figure 3 Frequency analysis and events in the third and fourth period:  
Water company Vitens expresses concerns (1), ‘Shalegas free’ declarations (2), Documentary Gasland on Dutch television (3), 
Hearing in the Parliament (4), Verdict of the administrative court (5), Announcement of a moratorium and an independent 
investigation (6). 
 
More requests for shale gas exploration permits came in; in the province of Limburg by Hutton 
and Gallic Energy and in the province of Gelderland by BNK General Partner. In response to 
this, the environmental NGOs Milieudefensie and those from the provinces of Noord-Brabant and 
Gelderland asked several municipalities to declare themselves ‘shale gas free’ (2). According to 
Milieudefensie a range of municipalities did so, beginning with the municipality of Tholen in 
August 2011 [54]. When the areas of interest started overlapping with the operating area of water 
company Vitens, this company (together with Brabant Water) warned about water pollution as 
well (mainly in July and September 2011) (1). The debate gained even more attention when 
Gasland was broadcasted on Dutch national television (September 2011) (3). Meanwhile, the 
Rabobank’s procedures in court continued. This gave the Minister of Economic Affairs direct 
reason to organise a hearing for the Parliament (4). At this hearing in September, several experts 
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and stakeholders explained the situation to the Parliament and answered questions. Many of these 
questions referred to the earlier mentioned earthquakes in Blackpool.  
Protests continued and more and more stakeholders were asking for a moratorium. The Dutch 
administrative court decided in October 2011 that Boxtel did not follow the right procedures (5). 
The argumentation was that if exploration would show that natural resources were to be 
economically producible, a production permit could be granted for the production of the gas. 
Therefore, shale gas exploration was not considered a temporary activity, which was the premise 
of the exploration permit, resulting in Cuadrilla's permit being withdrawn. Two days later, at a 
Parliament debate, the Minister answered the worries and requests of municipalities and 
announced an independent study into the risk of shale gas and coal-bed methane exploration and 
production (6). Until the research would be completed, no exploration wells would be drilled, and 
no new permit applications would be considered. 
3.3 Stage 3: The research performed
 
Figure 4 Frequency analysis and events in fifth and sixth period:  
Consultation rounds for the research of Economic Affairs (1), ‘Shale gas free’ declarations Haaren and Boxtel (2), foundation 




After the announcement of an independent study, media attention decreased. Protest groups asked 
the Minister to broaden the research on safety and environment as to include the utility and 
necessity of shale gas but the Minister responded that these are political matters that do not fit 
within this research (November 2011). The Minister did promise to consult multiple stakeholders 
for setting up the research questions [55], which led to a broad range of questions that could not 
all be answered in the time available for the study (1). Economic Affairs set up a ‘Feedback 
group’ (‘Klankbordgroep’) for the research.  The research however kept raising discussion. 
Further delay was caused by the consultation rounds and a European tender, which was won by a 
consortium consisting of engineering firms Witteveen + Bos (W+B), Arcadis and Fugro. Protest 
groups questioned the independence of this consortium (5). Several actors also complained about 
the so-called ‘independent’ expert who was involved in the ‘Feedback group’, because he was a 
known critic of ‘climate change theory’. 
Meanwhile, the municipality of Haaren rejected Cuadrilla’s permit request (January 2012). 
Haaren and Boxtel (and other municipalities) joined the ‘shale gas free’ campaign of 
Milieudefensie (2), although the town board of Boxtel kept shale gas development as a 
possibility. After the campaign the shale gas debate became more national. In April 2012, a 
national shale gas free NGO (‘Schaliegasvrij Nederland’) was founded by local communities and 
environmental organisations (Milieudefensie, Noord-Brabant and Gelderland environmental 
NGOS, and Greenpeace) (3). The protest groups continued with several protest actions and 
actively reported their ideas on shale gas developments: they reported that waste water 
regulations were changed [56], they explained how earthquakes in the province of Groningen are 
related to gas production in the area [57], and they performed a study on ways for municipalities 
to block shale gas development [58].  
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In May 2012 the International Energy Agency (IEA) provided estimates of the global shale gas 
reserves and spoke of the potential of a Golden Era for Gas [59]. But in the summer of 2012 
declining gas prices in the US made several companies depreciate their shale gas investments and 
the size and benefits of estimated shale gas reserves were questioned again (4). This development 
contributed to a bigger role in the societal debate for discussions on utility and necessity of shale 
gas development. 
 
3.4 Stage 4: The societal debate reaches its climax 
 
Figure 5 Frequency analysis and events in seventh and eight period:  
Coal export to Europe (1), energy-intensive industry complaints about the economic situation (2), earthquakes Groningen (3), 
Cuadrilla announces locations in the Noordoostpolder (4), doubts on the research of W+B (5), beer brewers express concerns 
(6), Labour Party changes it stance (7). 
 
Developments in the US kept influencing the Dutch societal debate. The high production level of 
shale gas in the US led to a surplus of American gas, declining fossil fuel prices, and cheap coal 
exported to Europe where CO2 emissions were rising (1). In this context, Shell pointed out that 
energy producers are increasingly using coal instead of gas. Together with the failing emissions 
trading scheme (ETS), cheap coal was given as e the reason for increasing CO2 emissions. Shell 
claimed that shale gas would provide a more sustainable solution whereas others argued that less 
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would be invested in sustainable energy technologies if shale gas was exploited, and therefore 
shale gas would only delay the transition to a sustainable energy supply.  
Dutch-based energy-intensive industries complained that declining gas prices in the US damaged 
their competitive position (November 2012) (2). Some companies even said they would make 
their future investments in the US. Others claimed the revolution in the US was just a temporary 
development and they explained the ‘bubble’ would soon burst.  
The geopolitical discourse became more dominant in the newspapers. The Hague Centre for 
Strategic Studies (HCSS) introduced the theme of geopolitics at several conferences. In March 
2013, after HCSS had been subject of a news program on national television, this theme was 
discussed more and more in the newspapers and this development would continue. 
At the beginning of the year 2013, earthquakes in Groningen measuring 3.7 on the Richter scale, 
resulting from gas production by the Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij (NAM) exceeded the 
expected maximum of 3.0 (3). Although Schaliegasvrij Nederland already linked (small) tremors 
in Groningen to gas production in August 2012, in February 2013 more actors started raising 
questions about the risk of earthquakes caused by fracking. The earthquakes in Blackpool were 
brought up again and in the political domain more questions about soil subsidence were asked. 
Suddenly, not only earthquakes were mentioned but soil subsidence was also mentioned as a 
cause for these earthquakes. 
At the same time, a large media publication peak occurred on the topic of shale gas. The research 
of Economic Affairs was coming to its end and some important events occurred that drew 
attention. First, Cuadrilla announced the locations of interest for shale gas exploration in another 
part of the Netherlands (the Noordoostpolder) (4). The television programme ‘Een Vandaag’ 
showed a surprised farmer on whose land exploration would take place but who had not been 
informed. The announcement and the information meeting organised by Cuadrilla received a lot 
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of attention. It caused large societal unrest in the Noordoostpolder. In a week a new protest group 
was founded; ‘Schaliegasvrij Noordoostpolder.’ Local unrest caused the previously positive 
municipality to declare itself ‘shale gas free’; shale gas exploration and production was 
considered to be incompatible with the municipality’s sustainability ambitions. Second, the 
Feedback group reported on their critiques of the W+B study a second and third time (5). 
Concerned with groundwater contamination, beer brewers and beverage manufacturers became 
critical towards shale gas as well (6). The social-democratic Labour Party suddenly became more 
positive towards shale gas. The party that held a crucial vote in the Dutch Parliament, changed its 
position on shale gas exploration from ‘negative unless it can be done safely’ to ‘positive as long 
as it can be done safely’ (7). The opposition in Parliament responded surprised. In May 2011, at 
the information meeting in Boxtel, the party expressed a negative stance towards shale gas 
exploration. Members of the Labour Party were surprised as well. At local level, most members 
of the Labour Party were against shale gas exploration. The national party reacted quickly and 
promised to consult their members. As a consequence, the Labour Party eventually announced it 
would vote against shale gas exploration. 
3.5 Stage 5: The societal debate continues 
 
Figure 6 Frequency analysis and events in the ninth period: 
Criticism on the study of W+B (1), manifest professors (2), Economic Affairs asks Feedback group to sign confidentiality 
agreement (3), research report published (4), the EIA committee gives advice to Economic Affairs (5), Economic Affairs 




The public debate around the research of engineering firm W+B continued (1). The 
environmental NGO Milieudefensie and Boxtel complained that the research was just a literature 
study and the EIA committee criticised the research for not being complete. The Minister of 
Economic Affairs responded to the press releases of the Feedback group by asking them to sign a 
confidentiality agreement (3). The research report was finished, but the Ministry wanted to have 
some time to study it before coming out with its policy plans. Several members of the Feedback 
group refused to sign and claimed that the Minister was trying to cover up the results. 
Concurrently, a group of influential professors criticised shale gas developments (2). Their main 
criticism was that policymakers had not strategically considered the impact of shale gas 
production on the transition to a sustainable energy supply. More actors spoke out against shale 
gas. The Rabobank did not grant loans to (US) farmers that participated in shale gas projects 
anymore. Vitens again warned against water contamination and produced a map that showed 
where shale gas and water zones overlap. The media organisation RTL claimed to have a copy of 
the research report and said that the Minister would conclude that shale gas exploration and 
production could be done safely. NOGEPA urged the Minister to calm the societal unrest and 
advised the Minister to gain public support by being more transparent.  
Then, the Minister of Economic Affairs published the research on shale gas exploration and 
production and concluded that the risks were low and could be mitigated (4). He emphasised that 
no decisions would be taken until the EIA committee had the chance to assess the research. 
Eventually, the EIA committee assessed the research as being too narrow as the it focused too 
much on underground effects. The committee concluded amongst others that the current 
regulation was not sufficient to cover the risks of shale gas exploration and production and 
advised the Minister to use a governmental spatial planning procedure (the so called 
23 
 
‘Rijksstructuurvisie’) to cover both underground and above ground impacts of shale gas 
developments (5). Such a particular study was said to broaden the scope to the role of shale gas in 
the light of the energy transition as well as to participation of local governments and communities 
[60]. The Minister decided to postpone his decision and announced a new study that would focus 
on all potential interesting locations so that local interests could be involved as well (6). The so-
called ‘Rijksstructuurvisie’ would be used together with an environmental impact assessment 
(plan-MER) to find out which locations within the Netherlands were most promising and easiest 
to mitigate risks. The Minister also announced that he wanted to involve local policy makers and 
the local communities of the potential locations. Moreover, the research would be used to 
investigate the technical options for risk mitigation together with water companies and the mining 
industry. The moratorium was prolonged so for the time being no important decisions would be 
taken [61]. This abated the shale gas debate. 
Meanwhile, developments abroad influenced the public debate. Disappointing results were reason 
to argue that shale gas exploration and production was not as promising as expected. At the same 
time, the UK found more shale gas than expected. Because of the many other interesting events at 
that time, the developments in the UK received little attention. Furthermore, the economic and 
sustainability themes received more attention as a response to a radio debate on news radio BNR. 
One of the arguments used was that shale gas might get the Netherlands out of the economic 
crisis; an argument that later returned in newspapers. Other arguments focused on the previously 
introduced sustainability arguments: shale gas was either perceived as a potential supplement to 
other energy technologies or as a delaying factor in the transition to a sustainable energy supply. 
In September 2013, after the Minister of Economic Affairs tried to calm down the debate, the 
‘Shale gas free’ campaign of Milieudefensie continued and the provinces of Noord-Brabant, 
Noord-Holland and Groningen declared themselves ‘Shale gas free’. The municipality of Boxtel 
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even declared to be ‘fossil-free’ and the province of Noord-Brabant rejected a geothermal energy 
project because it was not clear whether fracking would be used.  
Meanwhile, the earthquakes in Groningen continued. The decision of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs to continue with gas production in Groningen raised debate, as did the compensation 
given to the local community. In October a former employee of NAM accused the NAM of 
withholding information from the community of Groningen. The NAM, Royal Dutch 
Meteorological Institute (KNMI), State Supervision of Mines and the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs were accused of ignoring risks for too long. Next to the risks of earthquakes, 
compensation became more important in the debate. In this context, Cuadrilla was accused of 
being financially unable to compensate local communities when damage occurs.  
In the calm period after the announcement of an additional investigation, developments abroad 
became important again. The US became the largest oil and gas producing country overtaking 
Russia) and giving rise to discussions about the geopolitical consequences. Moreover, the 
German energy policy was widely debated in the Dutch newspapers. In this context, Germany 
was either mentioned as an example to show that the transition to more sustainable energy could 
be reached in only a few years, or as an example of an unsuccessful energy transition as the 





4. Results (2): discursive development of the shale gas controversy 
Table 1 Three thematic clusters  
 
Safety and Environment Utility and Necessity  Procedural Justice 
Water pollution and water use Economy Regulation and inspection 
Spatial impact   Estimates of stocks Distribution of costs and benefits 
  Traffic   Public treasury Decision-making process 
  Visual pollution   Affordability of gas    Openness and quality of information 
  Noise   Competitive position   Independence and quality of research 
  House prices   Creation of jobs   Public support 
Earthquakes Sustainability   Decision power of EA 
Air Pollution   CO2 emission   Involvement 
 
  Transition to sustainable energy    
    technologies  
   Resource depletion  
 Geopolitics  
   Security of supply  
   Independence from other countries  
 
 
The thematic analysis of the full set of newspaper articles and interviews results in three thematic 
clusters that played a role in the shale gas controversy. Table 1 shows the three thematic clusters 
‘safety and environment’, ‘utility and necessity’ and ‘procedural justice’, as well as the themes 
that constituted these clusters.  
Figure 7 shows the dominance of these clusters over time according to our T-Lab analysis. This 
shows that the ‘procedural justice’ cluster was most dominant over time. Yet, interviewees 
indicated that the debate was mainly about ‘safety & environment’. This may be explained by the 
relative unremitting presence of the ‘safety & environment cluster’. It may also be explained by a 
strategic use of procedural arguments for getting safety and environmental issues on the agenda. 
Interestingly, the relative decrease in dominance of the ‘procedural justice’ cluster goes together 
with a relative increase in the ‘utility & necessity’ cluster. This is in line with our findings in the 
previous section that the debate started locally with protests against the legitimacy of the 
procedures around the Boxtel/Haaren project, to shift to a national debate on the role of shale gas 
in the energy transitions. The ‘utility & necessity’ cluster starts off with sustainability and 
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geopolitics topics, but, in a later stage, economy becomes important as well. The ‘procedural 
justice’ cluster is most dominant at ‘peak publication periods’, which are, not surprisingly, times 
at which important decisions have to be taken. On the one hand the ‘procedural justice’ cluster 
involves proponents, who point out that the Dutch laws on regulation and inspection assure safe 
exploration and production of shale gas. On the other hand, opponents are in this cluster to point 




5. Two main normative conflicts  
From the above it appears that normative conflicts revolve around two questions that are critical 
for the direction of the energy transition in the Netherlands: 1) What should be the role of gas in 
the energy transition? and; 2) How to balance local and national interests in defining the public 
interest?  
Figure 7 Dominance of thematic clusters over time 
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5.1 What should be the role of gas in the energy transition? 
In the first stage of the constructed timeline, shale gas came on the agenda as part of a natural gas 
discourse, fitting in nicely with the policy of the Dutch government to exploit smaller gas fields 
in anticipation of the declining reserves of the (large) Groningen field. This is exemplified by the 
way that EBN refers to shalegas as ‘natural gas from shale’ rather than ‘shalegas’, emphasizing 
the business-as-usual character of the resource [62]. The approach taken was also business-as-
usual: after Cuadrilla received the exploration permits from the national government and 
Cuadrilla identified suitable locations for exploration drillings, the local governments of Boxtel 
and Haaren received requests for location specific permits. The role of natural gas in the 
Netherlands seems to have been, at least for the national government and EBN, so taken-for-
granted, that there was no reason to deviate from a business-as-usual procedure. This means that 
permitting for the proposed exploration project was dealt with on a local level, drawing upon 
regular procedures for the development of industrial activities in municipalities. As a result of 
this, the debate took place on a local level, and the concerns expressed mainly referred to local 
nuisances (tremors, water pollution, traffic, etc.). The debate was dominated by a ‘safety and 
environment’ and a ‘procedural justice’ discourse (see Figure 7) and no explicit references were 
made to normative diversity in terms of the preferred role of gas in the energy mix. In the 
subsequent stages however, the ‘utility and necessity’ cluster gained dominance in the debate 
(Figure 7), influenced by geopolitical developments and discussions about sustainability. The 
debate shifted attention more and more to the question what the role of shale gas in the Dutch 
energy transition should be. With this, the taken-for-granted position of gas in the Dutch energy 
mix was gradually and increasingly questioned. This was further reinforced by the earthquakes in 
the province of Groningen due to natural gas extraction.  
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In the societal debate different normative orientations can be identified. On the one end of the 
spectrum there are people who see natural gas as a fossil, and hence unsustainable, fuel that 
deserves no role in the future energy mix. On the other end of the spectrum are people who see 
natural gas as a relatively clean fuel that can serve the transition to a sustainable energy system 
where gas (methane, hydrogen, etc) and the gas infrastructure play a key role to balance energy 
demand and supply.  
 
5.2 How to balance local and national interests in defining the public 
interest? 
The second main normative conflict addresses how institutions create space for articulation of 
energy policy interests at different policy making levels. At the start of the process, the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs found the exploration of shale gas to be in the public interest. They based 
this on considerations such as the revenues shale gas could bring to the state, the position of the 
Netherlands as a gas-country and the ambition to become a gas-hub. When the Ministry decided 
to grant the general exploration permits, the procedure at the national level ended and continued 
on the local level. Here, local governments considered giving a local exploration permit based on 
factors such as local economic opportunities and local nuisances and risks. When the debate 
shifted to the utility and necessity of shale gas (Figure 7), a normative conflict was articulated 
with regard to the question which actors are responsible for, or even allowed to be concerned 
with, public interests. In this case, the national government defined the public interest of shale 
gas exploration based on national interests such as the Netherlands being a gas-country, revenues 
to the state, and the ambition to become a gas-hub. However, in the second phase of the debate 
other public interests were articulated such as the mitigation of climate change and the transition 
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to an energy system based on renewables. The local arena was however not effective for 
discussing the public interest of shale gas. This discussion rather took place in a national arena, 
including national-level actors. For example, when the debate shifted towards a discussion on the 
role of shale gas in the energy system, environmental organisations and local municipalities (who 
had already developed local anti-shale gas movements) founded a national anti-shale gas NGO. 
Local actors thus faced difficulties putting issues of public interests on the agenda; they had to 
find ways to become part of the arena in which the public interest was being discussed. At the 
same time one may argue that the discursive shift to utility and necessity of shale gas provided 
local actors strategic leverage to enact their anti-shale gas position.  
The normative conflict thus arises from a de facto conflation between the general public interest 
of energy and the national interest. While the national interest is to be protected by the national 
government, local government, on the other hand, oversees the local interests of energy projects. 
The pre-structuring of interests at different levels creates difficulties for local stakeholders to 
raise concerns about the public interest.  
In essence, the ‘public interest’ is an intangible phenomenon [63-65], as there is no way to 
unequivocally decide what is the preference of society as a whole. In democratic welfare states 
this intangible public interest gets a concrete expression by the workings of an extensive 
institutional apparatus that is usually taken for granted [66]. Law, formal assessment, customary 
forms of consultation, parliamentary consent, and so on, present a system that accounts for the 
legitimacy of collectively binding decisions. Our analysis shows how shale gas became a source 
for questioning this taken-for-granted institutional structuring of defining the public interest. It 
leads to the question to what extent institutional structures for decision-making on energy 
projects fit the dynamic nature and normative complexity of the energy transitions.  
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6. Conclusion and discussion 
We have conceptualized societal conflict as informal assessment that has the potential for 
normative learning as regards the direction, speed and means of transition. We argued that 
transition studies should capitalize on this value of societal conflict for analysis of transitions. 
Such analysis is critical to transition studies that are to address the governance implications of 
divergent normative perspectives [2]. 
 
The results show the complex socio-political dynamics of the societal conflict on shale gas. From 
these, two main normative conflicts were identified: firstly relating to the role of gas in the 
energy transition, and; secondly relating to the balance of local and national interests in the 
definition of the public interest. The informal assessment that took place in this social conflict 
articulates not only different appraisals of shale gas and gas in a wider sense, but also of 
institutions and policy procedures in place to serve diverse public interests. The societal conflict 
thus challenges two key elements of the Dutch welfare state, i.e. the role of natural gas on the one 
hand and the allocation of who is allowed to formulate the public interest on the other hand. 
 
The second part of our research question was to what extent the normative conflicts led to 
learning. We conclude that there has been learning about the role of shale gas in the Dutch energy 
transition. Our analysis shows the discursive shift from shale gas as a local safety and risk issue 
within a business-as-usual framing of ‘natural gas from shale’, towards a national debate on the 
utility and necessity of shale gas. Shale gas, along with other developments like the failure to 
introduce carbon capture and storage (which also relies largely on the gas regime), a series of 
earthquakes and the consequent reduction of natural gas production, challenged and changed the 
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hitherto dominant discourse of the Netherlands as a ‘gas country’, in which gas will play a 
continuing role as the ‘transition fuel’. With regard to the normative conflict on the question how 
to balance local and national interests in defining the public interest, however, we conclude that 
hardly any higher-order learning has been taking place. Higher-order learning with regard to this 
normative conflict would mean that there would have been an institutional restructuring of 
defining the public interest. In other words, if higher-order learning took place, the de facto 
institutional merging of national and public interests would have been reconsidered or even 
restructured. We do not observe any such changes however. This leads us to conclude that little 
learning took place with regard to this conflict.  
 
The objective of our paper was to empirically explore how the study of societal conflict can 
reveal insight into normative diversity and higher-order learning in transitions. Our study shows 
that controversy figures as an entry point to analyse the normative dimensions of the direction 
that a transition should take and the speed and means by which it should be achieved. In order to 
bring this line of inquiry further, more empirical and conceptual work is needed. Empirically, the 
transition dynamics that are created by societal conflict need further attention. Our case showed 
how a project, that was initially approached in a business-as-usual way, dealt with as any 
industrial activity, evolved into a fierce national debate over how we want the energy transition to 
take shape in the Netherlands. An example of the system dynamics from the shale gas case 
concerns the role of polarisation. Polarisation in itself is not productive in terms of articulating 
diversity or learning, because pro- and opponents are stuck in a deadlock. In the case of shale gas 
though, polarisation had an agenda setting function, as it increased media attention, mobilised 
people and resources. Polarisation may thus not only be hard to avoid, it may prove, counter-
intuitively, an important mechanism for learning through societal conflict [also see 67]. Such 
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mechanisms need to be empirically investigated in further research (a similar effect of 
polarisation has been observed in a shale gas controversy in New York [see 68]. Since societal 
conflicts are enacted increasingly on digital platforms and social media, it would be interesting to 
compare and complement traditional media-analysis with online analysis [e.g. 69] and aim for 
better understanding of the role of media in societal conflict.  
 
Further research could focus on conceptualizing the socio-political dynamics of societal conflict 
within transition studies frameworks. We argued that the multi-level perspective has its 
limitations for studying normative conflicts in transitions as it brings to light some issues but 
obscures others [19,20]. Whereas the multi-level perspective assumes conflict between a 
(desirable) niche and a (problematic) regime, the categories of niche and regime are not 
instrumental for understanding and conceptualizing conflict in this case. The companies starting 
shale gas exploration are small newcomers on the (established) gas market, resembling a niche, 
but these companies have strong ties and are backed by the regime. The introduction of shale gas 
is contested, not by the incumbent regime, but by NGOs and local actors. And importantly, the 
desirability of shale gas itself is ambiguous and contested. The typical way in which the multi-
level perspective is applied is of limited value for analysing societal conflict, especially in cases 
such as this one, where normative diversity does not coincide with boundaries of socio-technical 
niches.. At the same time, we did observe interactions between hierarchical and nested levels that 
resemble familiar transition patterns. For example, aggregated expectations and institutions can 
emerge from a series of small, local conflicts, i.e. niches [cf. 70]. Another example is the 
interplay between niches (local conflicts), landscape developments (like the Gasland 
documentary and international shale gas experience) and a defensive institutional regime of 
planning energy projects, that in many ways resembles transition patterns described by Geels and 
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Schot [71], or De Haan and Rotmans [9]. This suggests that a way forward in conceptualizing the 
socio-political dynamics of societal conflict within transition studies frameworks would require 
taking a different unit of analysis than is common in transition studies. For the study of normative 
conflicts in transitions it seems interesting to shift focus and use the societal conflict as a unit of 
analysis within a multi-level framework rather than a specific innovation/socio-technical system 
(wind, biogas, shale gas) as is common. Theoretically, it may help transition researchers to draw 
upon wider political science literature [72-74]. After all, further conceptualization of societal 
conflicts is needed since sustainability transitions not only imply new (socially embedded) 
technologies but also new normative imperatives for thinking about progress and change.  
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